

8654

No. _____

Supreme Court of Illinois

Samuel W. Lessly et al

vs.

Mary Lessly

71641  7

Walker. This was a bill in Chancery filed by defendant in error in the Randolph Circuit Court, against plaintiff in error. The bill alleges, that defendant in error is the widow of Matthew Lesley deceased; that he died in April 1864, leaving no children or descendants or descendants of children, or father or mother surviving him, but left a brother and the descendants of his deceased sister, surviving him. That he left both real and personal property, which the bill describes. That he made a last will, by which he made sundry bequests and legacies, among others, he gave his lands to defendant in error, his lands to her for her life, with a remainder over in fee to Matthew Lesley. That she assented to the provisions made in her favor, and elected to take her dower and legal share of the estate of her husband. That subsequently, she under her hand and seal elected in lieu of dower and the provisions of the will in her favor one half of the real estate, and dower in the other half, and the whole of his personal property after payment of debts. And prays for partition, and assignment of her dower, and the establishment of her title to the property.

The answer admits that defendant in

error is the widow of Matthew Sefly deceased.
 That he left no children or the descendants of
 children. Admits the will is correctly stated;
 that defendant in error relinquished the pro-
 visions of the will as stated in the bill, but
 denies that she is entitled to one half of the
 real estate, or to dower in the other half of the
 lands, or is entitled to the personal property of
 deceased, inasmuch as the whole of it was be-
 queathed by the will and is charged with the
 payment of such bequests. On the hearing the
 Circuit Court granted the prayer of the bill
 and decreed the relief sought. The cause is now
 - put to this Court to reverse that decree.

In the case of *Lyon vs Pastelthwait* 13
 Ill. 727, it was held that a widow of an intes-
 -tate husband, under the forty sixth section
 of our Statute of Wills inherits as heir to an
 intestate husband, one half of his real, and
 the whole of his personal property of which
 he died seized, after the payment of the debts
 of the estate and also to be endowed in the
 remainder of his ^{real} estate. It was also held
 that this section was not repealed by the 15th
 section of the dower act, of 1846, and that
 these sections were not repugnant. Again
 in the case *Sturgis vs Ewing* 18 Ill 176, the
 same rule was recognized and a constructi-
 -on was given to the fifteenth section of the

devised act. And in this latter case it was held that the widow of a testator leaving no children or descendants of children, may, if she elect, have in lieu of ^{her} dower, in the estate of which her husband died seized one half of all of his real estate. That this section in its provisions applied to testate estates. Whilst the forty sixth applies to intestate estates.

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 By the latter of these cases, the rule is announced, that the widow of a testator leaving no children or descendants of children may elect to renounce the provisions of the will made in her favor and elect to take one half of the real estate of which he died seized. And as heir to her husband she thereby becomes invested with the title in fee to that portion. Again in the case of Pitney vs Brown (decided at the June term 1866) the same rule was announced, and the widow permitted to elect to take one half of the land in fee, of which her husband died seized of an estate of inheritance either at law or in equity. Under these authorities, the widow in this case was entitled to the dower for one half of the real estate named in her will and which was decreed to her by the court below.

This right of election proceeds upon
 the grounds, that the wife has an inter-
 est in the estate of the husband, of which
 he cannot deprive her by will or other-
 wise, without her consent. And when
 he attempts to do so, she has the right
 to elect whether she will take the pro-
 vision made for her by the will or
 renounce it and take such rights in
 his estate as the law gives to her. She
 cannot claim a portion of the provisions
 of the will and reject others, and claim un-
 der the statute. She must claim alone un-
 der the will or altogether independent of
 its provisions. When however she has re-
 nounced under the provisions of the will
 she is restored to her rights under the statute
 and such cases are provided for by the
 fifteenth section of the dower act. It declares
 that if a husband dies leaving a widow
 but no children or descendants of children
 the widow may if she elect have in lieu
 of her dower in the estate of ^{which} her husband
 died single, whether it shall, or shall not
 have been assigned her, one half of the
 real estate in fee simple, in her sole right
 which shall remain after the payment of
 the debts and claims against his estate. And
 she may make an election within two months

after being notified of the payment of such debts.

By this provision, the widow by retaining the provisions of the will makes her dower in her husband's real estate, but gets in lieu of it, one half of the lands after payment of ^{the} debts.

This section in the case of *Sturgis vs Ewing* 18 Ill. 176, was held to apply ^{alone} to testate estates. And the case of *Lyon vs Pastelthwait* 13 Ill. 727, holds that the forty sixth section of the statute of wills applies to intestate estates, and was the more liberal of the two in its provisions. It is not more liberal and beneficial to the widow, unless it is because it gives dower in the remaining half of the real estate ~~and~~ ^{or} all of the personal property which remains after the payment of the debts, whilst the fifteenth section of the dower act only gives one half of the real estate, as it ~~which~~ declares that if the widow elects to take one half of the lands of which her husband died seized, that it shall be in lieu of dower. This language is comprehensive enough to embrace dower in all of the lands ~~and~~ ~~personally~~. It will not reasonably bear any other construction.

The sixth section of the act of February

11th 1847, (Less Laws. p 169) defines the word dow-
er as employed in the forty sixth section of
the Chapter entitled Wills, to embrace a do-
-ving to the widow of one third of the per-
sonal estate of intestate estates for ever, af-
-ter the payment of debts. If this is taken
as the definition of the word, then ^{all of} the
personal property remaining after the pay-
-ment of debts, cannot be claimed where
there has been ^{such} an election by the widow
the law ^{is} taken in lieu of that, as well as
dower, in the other half of the real estate.
A different rule prevails where under these
two sections. The first section of the act of
1847, however, gives to the widow in all
cases the specific articles of personal prop-
erty enumerated in the act. It makes no
distinction between testate or intestate
estates. The right is the same in all cases,
if the widow resides in ~~this state~~ and ad-
ministration is had in this state. We there-
-fore have no hesitation in believing that
defendant in error, is entitled to $\frac{1}{2}$ one
half of the real estate of her deceased husband,
and the specific articles ~~she~~ enumerated
in the statute. But the court below erred
in deciding that she was entitled to dower
in the remaining half of the real estate, and
the personal ~~prop~~ estate after payment of

all

Wts. The dice must therefore be removed
and the case unanited.

Dice removed.

Sam^l. W. Lesly

8 vs 14

Mary Lesly

June 9. ~~1866~~
1867

Opinion by
Warren J.

Q/E

8654

State of Illinois } In the Circuit Court of Randolph
Randolph County } doings County, April Term A. D. 1866.

Be it remembered that at the April Term A. D. 1866 of the Circuit Court of Randolph County, State of Illinois, before Silas L. Bryan, Judge of said Circuit Court, then and there presiding in open Court the following cause was tried & decided in said Court, sitting in Chancery, on Bill, answer, replication & proofs, viz:

Copy of Bill in Chancery.

State of Illinois } April term A. D. 1865
Randolph County } of Randolph Circuit Court

To the Hon Judge of the Randolph Circuit Court in
Chancery sitting

Humbly Complaining Shows to your Honor your
Oratrix, Mary Sefly, a resident of said County,
That in March A. D. 1826 your Oratrix was lawfully married
to Matthew Sefly in said County and they continued to
reside in said County as husband and wife until the
Eleventh day of April A. D. 1864, when the said Matthew
Sefly died leaving your Oratrix his widow and no child
born or descendants or father or mother surviving him

Your Oratrix further Shows to your Honor: That the
said Matthew Sefly had in his life time One brother
Samuel W Sefly who still survives him and Ann Little
his sister who died some fifteen years before leaving the

following Children to wit: Elizabeth Murray wife of George Murray deceased, Margret Lee, John, Samuel, and James K. P. Little and Nancy wife of Isaac M. James Said Margret died six years ago leaving two Children to wit: Elizabeth King and Nettie Lee

Said John died nearly two years ago leaving the following Children to wit: James, John & Ann Little, The said Ann Little also left the following grand Children by her daughter Jane who died before said Ann Little to wit: Ann Walker and Josiah Walker.

Your Oratrix further shews to your Honor, That the said Matthew Lesly died seized in fee simple of the following land lying in said County to wit, fifty acres of land bounded as follows to wit beginning at a post twenty Chains east of the quarter section corner between sections nineteen and twenty township four South of range six west from which post a pine oak twenty inches in diameter bears South eighty eight degrees west distant fifty links, and another pine oak twenty inches in diameter bears north 56° East distant thirteen links running South twelve Chains and fifty links to a post from which a post oak twenty inches in diameter bears South 60° West eight links, and pine oak twelve inches in diameter bears north forty three and one half degrees east seventy six links distant then east forty Chains to a post from which a Cottonwood six inches in diameter bears north twenty five degrees west One hundred and twenty links

then north twelve chains and fifty links to a post in prairie, then west forty chains to the beginning. Also the South half of the North east quarter of Section twenty in Township four South of range Six West and the South west quarter of the North West quarter of Section twenty One in same Township and range as will be shown by the United States patents and a deed to said Matthew Lepley which deed is duly recorded in the records office of said County in book C pages 515 & 516 and which will be produced on the hearing of this Cause

Your Oratrix further Shows to your Honor That the said Matthew Lepley left at the time of his death a last will and testament which has been duly proved in the County Court of said County and a copy whereof is marked Exhibit "A" and made a part of this bill. Your Oratrix further Shows to your Honor That on the 12th day of September A.D. 1864, your Oratrix caused to be filed in the office of the County Court of said County a writing under her hand and seal of that date renouncing the provisions made for her benefit in said last will and testament, and elected in lieu thereof to take her dower or legal share of the Estate of her husband. And afterwards to wit on the 13th day of September A.D. 1864 your Oratrix by another writing under her hand and seal of that date thereby in pursuance of the ~~state~~ laws of the State of Missouri did elect to

take in lieu of dower & the provisions in said will
for her benefit one half of the real estate of which said Math-
ew Seely died seized & dower in the other half and the
whole of his personal property or estate which might be left
after paying all the just debts and claims against the estate
of her said deceased husband which paper writing was on
the same day filed in the office of the Clerk of said
County Court. Your Oratory further states that the
personal property of said deceased is more than suf-
ficient to pay all the claims against and debts
due by said estate together with the costs of admin-
istration thereon & that the said Samuel W Seely
is Executor under said last will and testament
Your Oratory therefore claims that she is entitled
to the undivided half of all of said ^{real} estate of which
her said husband died seized as a present and
dower in the other half thereof, and that the said
Samuel ~~W~~ Seely is entitled to 1/4 of said land
subject to said dower; each of the said children
of the said Ann Little is entitled to the undivided
one seventh of one half of said land subject to
said dower and that the said descendants of deceased
children of said Ann Little are entitled to the
portion of the said deceased parents, ^{in consideration of the premises} Your Oratory
prays that the said Samuel W Seely, Elizabeth
Murray (of Tamasora) Samuel Little, James R. P
Little a minor Isaac M James & Nancy his wife
Elizabeth King a minor (of Nashville) Nettie Lee

a minor (of Tamarora) James Little, a minor, John Little, a minor & Ann Little, a minor Ann Walker & Fizeah Walker a minor may be made defts to this bill & Summoned to answer the same but on answer or oath is expressly waived, and that a guardian ad litem may be appointed for said Minors & that the respective rights of the parties hereto may be established & that Commissioners may be appointed to set off said Lower & the undivided half of said Land to your Oratrix & that such other and further relief may be granted in the premises as the Case requires

And your Oratrix as in duty bound will ever pray

Attest C F Toelling

Mary ^{her} ~~Lefty~~ _{mark}

W H Underwood

Sol for Compt
State of Illinois
Randolph County }

Mary Lefty Complainant being duly sworn says that said James R P Little & Isaac M James have gone out of the State of Illinois so that process cannot be served upon them and that the statements and charges in the foregoing bill are true according to the best of her knowledge information & belief

Mary ^{her} ~~Lefty~~ _{mark}

Subscribed & sworn to before me

Wm S Thomas, Clerk of St Clair Circuit
Court this 21st Sept 1864 at my office
in Belleville Ill, in witness whereof
I have here to affix my name and the
seal of said Court
Wm S Thomas Clk

Filed September 23rd 1864
S. S. Vrain Clk

The following is a copy of the Amended Bill

Mary Seely } Bill in Chancery
vs }
Samuel W Seely }
et al }

And the said Complainant for Amendment to
said bill hereby make the devises of said bill
partis dect to this bill to wit:

William W Seely, Matthew Seely Mary Amanda
James Mary Elizabeth Seely, Matthew Seely
James Seely, Nancy James, Jane Burnett
Mary Seely Complainant

Filed April 25th 1865
S. S. Vrain Clk

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The following is a copy of Answer & Exceptions thereto

State of Illinois

Randolph County Circuit Court April Term 1865

Mary Sessly Complainant

vs

Samuel W Sessly &
other Defendants

} Bill in Chancery

The Separate answer of Samuel W Sessly, for answer says that true it is S^d Complainant is the Widow of said Matthew Sessly dec^d, and respondent admits S^d decedent at his death left no children or descendants of a child or children, or father or Mother. He admits that the exhibit marked A in Complainants bill is a true copy of the last Will and Testament of S^d Matthew Sessly dec^d. Respondent admits also, that S^d Complainant as stated in said bill made the relinquishment of all the provisions & bequests made to her in said Will. Respondent admits that lands are properly described in said bill, Respondent admits that the collateral heirs are properly described in the bill and Amendment.

But this respondent denies that S^d P^{ty} is by law entitled to one half the real estate described, because he charges that; the Statute in such case made and provided has reference to intestate estate only.

And the Respondent further denies even if she the
 sd Comptt were entitled by law to one half of said
 Land, that she is so entitled in lieu of all dower, and
 he denies that she is entitled by law to dower in the
 residue or other half of said Land

And Respondent denies further, that S Comptt
 is by law entitled to the personal estate of said deceased.
 For that the whole of said personal estate is bequeathed by
 said will and is thereby a charge upon said estate for
 payment, and because or if our Respondent believes and
 charges that in case the said Complainant is entitled by
 law to one half the land in such case, she is entitled
 to nothing more, except the specific articles of property or
 money in Sec 1 Laws 1847 page 168

Respondent further charges that the sd Complainant
 by her said election is cut of from all participation
 or right to any part of the personal estate

And hearing fully answered prays to be dismissed
 with his reasonable costs &c

Samuel W Sessly

clerk

By H H S O Melony
 Johnson & Hartzell
 his Sol^o

Lepty
vs
Lepty et al } In Chancery

And the said Complainant Comes & excepts to so much of said answer as denies her legal & equitable rights under the admitted facts stated in said answer

Underwood & Neelley
Sols for Compt

Filed April 25th 1865
S. S. Train Clerk

The following is a copy of Guardian Ad Litem Report

State of Missouri } In Randolph Circuit Court
Randolph County } of the April Term A.D. 1865

Mary Lepty
vs
Samuel W. Lepty et al } In Chancery for Partition

The undersigned John Meckan Guardian Ad Litem for the Minor Defendants in the above entitled Cause would Respectfully Report that he has Examined the papers in said Cause, and finds that Service has been had on a part of said Minors and that the appearance of the remaining Minor Defendants has been entered by Atty

And he would here distinctly deny the justice of

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The Claims of the Said Complainant and Petitioner
that the prayer of Said Bill in Chancery ought-
in law and equity- to be refused
All of which is respectfully Submitted

John Mehan

Guardian Ad Litem

Filed April 25 1865 }
S. S. Train Clerk }

The following is a copy of last will &c

I Matthew Sessy of the County of Randolph and
State of Illinois, do make and publish this my last
Will and Testament in manner and form following, viz!

1st It is my ~~last~~ will that my funeral expenses and all
my just debts be fully paid

2^d I give and devise to my beloved wife Mary all
my Land to be for her use and benefit during her
natural life

3^d I give and bequeath to William W Sessy
Three hundred Dollars at his majority provided
he live with my wife until that time, say twenty
one years of age

4th I give and bequeath to Matthew Sessy at my
wife death, all my Real Estate, and in case he dies
without heirs of his own body, then

5th I give and bequeath to James Sessy and William
W Sessy, the said Real Estate only they shall pay


to the heirs of Samuel W Lesty and Anna Little who
may be alive, fifty dollars a piece

6th I give and bequeath of my personal property to
Isaac James daughter, Mary Amanda, and to James
Lesty's daughter and son Mary Elizabeth and Matthew
& I fifty Dollars a piece when the come of age

7th I give and bequeath to my beloved wife Mary
in addition to article 2; four hundred Dollars to be
at her disposal wholly.

8th I give and bequeath to James Lesty William
W Lesty, Nancy James, and Jane Burnett or their
respective heirs out of the balance of my personal Estate
equal shares.

And, lastly, I constitute and appoint Samuel W
Lesty, my brother, Executor of this my last will
and testament, revoking and annulling all former
Wills by me made and ratifying this and no other
to be my last Will and Testament. - In testimony
whereof I have hereunto set my hand and Seal this
Nineteenth day of June in the year of our Lord
Eighteen hundred and Sixty two

Matthew ^{his} Lesty 
_{made}

Signed, published and declared by the said Matthew
Lesty as and for his last Will and testament in the
presence of us who at his request have signed as Witnesses
to the Same

R. W. Marshall
Joseph Lesty

State of Illinois
Randolph County

I Joseph Schnepfer Clerk of the County Court do hereby Certify that the foregoing and within is a true and correct Copy of the Last Will and Testament of Mathew Seely deceased as appears on Record and file in my Office

In Witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal of office at Chester this 24th day of August AD 1864

Real Seal



Joseph Schnepfer
Clerk

Filed September 23^d 1864
S. F. Vrain Clerk

The following is a copy of the order of Court

Randolph County Circuit Court February Special Term A D 1865

Mary Sessly

vs

Samuel W Sessly et al

} Petition for Partition &c

The Cause is continued to the next regular term of this Court &c

The following is a copy of the order of Court

Randolph County Circuit Court April term A D 1865

April 25th 1865

Mary Sessly

vs

Samuel W Sessly, Elizabeth Murray

Samuel Little, Isaac M James

Nancy James, Ann Walker

James R Little, Elizabeth King

Nettie Lee James Little.

John Little Ann Little

Lizabeth Walker William W Sessly

Matthew Sessly, Mary Amanda James

Mary Elizabeth Sessly Matthew Sessly

James Sessly, Jane Burnett

} Bill for Partition &c

} And now on the first Tuesday of the term

comes the said Complainant and leave is given her to
 amend her bill and said Amendment is thereupon filed
 making all the deverzies of said Matthew Sessy deceased
 parties defendants & O'Melroy Solicitor for Defts
 enters the appearance of Matthew Sessy & James Sessy
 & Underwood Sol for Complainant pro forma enters
 the appearance of the Defts, not Served and John
 Michael Eeg is appointed guardian ad litem for
 the Minor defendants and a rule is entered upon
 all the defendants to answer by 2 O'clock P.M.
 and on Thursday the Minor defendants by their guar-
 dian files their answer and also the said Samuel
 W Sessy files Answer and said Complainant excepts
 to so much of said answer of Samuel W Sessy
 so Claims that said Complainant is entitled
 to less interests in the Estate of her deceased husband
 Matthew Sessy than alleged in said bill which
 exception is Sustaind by the Court. And the
 Court being Satisfied by evidence of the truth of the
 said bill and that Matthew Sessy died in April
 1864 Siquid in fee Simple of the Lands des-
 cribed in said bill to wit fifty acres of land bounded
 as follows to wit beginning at a post twenty chains
 east of the quarter section Corner between section
 nineteen and twenty township four South of Range
 Six west from which post a pin oak twenty inches
 in diameter bears South eighty eight degrees west
 distant fifty cents, and other pin oak twenty

inches in diameter bears north 56° East distant thirteen
 links running South twelve Chains and fifty links
 to a post from which a post oak twenty inches in
 diameter bears South 60° West eight links and a
 pin oak twelve inches in diameter bears north forty
 three and one half degrees east Seventy six links
 distant then east forty Chains to a post from
 which a Cotton Wood six inches in diameter bears
 north twenty five degrees West One hundred and
 twenty links thence north twelve Chains and
 fifty links to a post in prairie then west forty
 Chains to the beginning Also the South half of the
 North East quarter of section twenty in township
 four South of Range six West and the South West
 quarter of the North West quarter of section twenty
 One in same township and range and of personal
 property & that said deceased left a last will &
 testament & that Samuel W Leshy is Executor
 under said will that said Complainant is the
 Widow of said Matthew Leshy deceased and that
 he left no descendant or child and that said Widow
 has renounced all Claims as deriver under said will
 as alleged in said bill and elected to treat the Estate
 of her said deceased husband as to her as intestate
 estate It is therefore ordered & decreed that the said
 Samuel W Leshy as executor as aforesaid set off
 to said Complainant her separate property as
 Widow or pay to her its equivalent in money and

upon the final Settlement of said estate pay over to said Complainant the Surplus of the personal estate of said deceased as her inheritance. It is further determined ordered and decreed by the Court that said Complainant be entitled to the One undivided half of said land and down in the other half and that the residue of said land be disposed of according to the provisions of the ^{said} last Will and testament of said deceased. It is further ordered that William Houston, James J. Borders & James W. Mustus be appointed Commissioners to assign said down and set off & partition to said Complainant her half of said land by metes and bounds & this Cause is Continued for report &c To all which Judgment of the Court in the rendition of said decree, the Depts by their Solicitors then and there excepted &c

Randolph County Circuit Court September term A.D. 1865

September 19th 1865

Mary Serby

vs

Samuel W. Serby et al

} Petition for Partition &c

And now on this day comes said Complainant by Wm H. Underwood and on his motion this Cause is continued generally &c

Randolph County Circuit Court April Term A D 1866

Mary Seely

vs

Samuel W Seely et al

} Petition for partition &c

And now at this day to wit
Friday April 27th 1866 Comes said Complainant
by W. H. Underwood her Solicitor and on his motion
this Cause is Continued &c

State of Illinois }
Randolph County } ss

I Sammie S. Wain Clerk of the
Circuit Court within and for the County and State
aforesaid do hereby certify that the annexed and fol-
lowing pages contain a full true and correct copy of
the whole record in the Case wherein Mary Seely
is Complainant and Samuel W Seely et al are
defendants, beginning with the Original Bill
Amended Bill, Answer & Exceptions, Guardian
Ad Litem Answer Copy of Will and all orders and
decrees of said Cause by said Circuit Court

In testimony whereof I have hereunto sub-
scribed my hand and affixed the seal
of said Circuit Court at Chester Ills
this 10th day of October in the year one
thousand eight hundred and sixty six
Sammie S. Wain Clerk

And now comes the 1st p[ar]t in error by HIOB
O'Melaney their atty. + by the foregoing record
say therein manifest errors, + for such
errors, accuse for error

1st The court erred in decreeing down to Mary
Lively, in the half of said land not set
a part to her,

2 The court erred in decreeing that the
separate property allowed to widower under
the statute be set a part to Mary Lively.

3 The court erred, in rendering said decree
in manner and form as rendered in
not definitively settling whether the proper
separates, were or were not to be paid
by the Ex^{or}.

founder in error

HIOB O'Melaney

Samuel W. Lively, Eliza Lett
Mary, James L. Little, Isaac
M. James, Nancy James,
Jane Walker James, K. Little

Elizabeth King, Maria Lee,
James L. Little, John Little
Jane Little, Asiah Walker,
William W. Lively, Mathew
Lively, Mary A. James,
Mary E. Lively, Mathew
Lively, James Lively and
Jane Burnett, Plaintiff
vs.
in Error

Wm. Underwood, Sol for Def^t,

Mary Lively, Defend^{ant}
vs.
in Error.

Error to Randolph.

Clerk will please issue
for to Randolph
X of agy
H.K.S. O'Melaney

Clerk fee \$ 6 00

Filed, Oct. 17-1866

M. Solomonson atty

Paid by A. M. Davis

\$5.00

O'MELVENY & HOUCK,

Attorneys at Law.

Cairo, Ill., Oct. 15, 1866.

M^r. Johnson.M^r. Vernon.

Dear Sir:

Please docket & issue cc. ja. to your error to Randolph County, enclosing same in letter to Johnson & Hartzell, attys., with request from me that they see to it that it is served at once, and without delay.

Respectfully

H. K. S. O'Melveny.

State of Illinois, }
SUPREME COURT, } SS
First Grand Division.

The People of the State of Illinois,

To the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the County of Randolph Greeting:

Because, In the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which was in the Circuit Court of Randolph county, before the Judge thereof between

Mary Sessly plaintiff and

Samuel M. Sessly and others defendants it is said manifest error hath intervened to the injury of the aforesaid defendants,

as we are informed by their complaint, and we being willing that error, if any there be, should be corrected in due form and manner, and that justice be done to the parties aforesaid, command you that if judgment thereof be given, you distinctly and openly without delay send to our Justices of our Supreme Court the record and proceedings of the plaint aforesaid, with all things touching the same, under your seal, so that we may have the same before our Justices aforesaid at **Mount Vernon**, in the County of Jefferson, on the first Tuesday in the month of November next, that the record and proceedings, being inspected, we may cause to be done therein, to correct the error, what of right ought to be done according to law.

WITNESS, the Hon. P. H. Walker Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the seal thereof, at MOUNT VERNON, this seventeenth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty six.

Arch. Johnston

Clerk of the Supreme Court.

SUPREME COURT. 25
First Grand Division.

Samuel M. Sessely
and others
Plaintiffs in Error,

VS.

Mary Sessely
Defendant in Error.

WRIT OF ERROR.

Issued & FILED. Certs
17-1866

N. Johnston Cllk



State of Illinois
SUPREME COURT
First Grand Division

At the Court of the Circuit Court for the County of Cook, in the State of Illinois, this 17th day of August, 1866, the People of the State of Illinois, by their Senators and Representatives, do hereby certify that the following is a true and correct copy of the original of the same as the same is now on file in the Court of the said County of Cook, in the State of Illinois.

[Faint, illegible handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

State of Illinois,
SUPREME COURT,
First Grand Division. } SS

The People of the State of Illinois,
To the Sheriff of Randolph County.

Because, In the record and proceedings, and also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which was in the Circuit Court of Randolph county, before the Judge thereof between

Mary Sessly plaintiff and

Samuel M. Sessly and others defendants it is said that manifest error hath intervened to the injury of said defendants as we

are informed by their complaint, the record and proceedings of which said judgments, we have caused to be brought into our Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, at Mount Vernon, before the justices thereof, to correct the errors in the same, in due form and manner, according to law; therefore we command you, that by good and lawful men of your county, you give notice to the said Mary Sessly

that she be and appear before the justices of our said Supreme Court; at the next term of said Court, to be holden at **Mount Vernon**, in said State, on the first Tuesday ~~after the said Monday~~ in November next, to hear the records and proceedings aforesaid, and the errors assigned, if she shall think fit; and further to do and receive what the said Court shall order in this behalf; and have you then there the names of those by whom you shall give the said Mary Sessly notice together with this writ.

WITNESS, the Hon. P. H. Walker Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the seal thereof, at MOUNT VERNON, this seventeenth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty six.

Noah Johnson
Clerk of the Supreme Court.

SUPREME COURT.
First Grand Division.

Samuel W. Sessly
and others
Plaintiffs in Error,

vs.

Mary Sessly
Defendant in Error.

SCIRE FACIAS.

FILED - Nov 5 1866.

Wm. Johnston Clk

I have served the within writ by reading
the same to the within named
Mary Sessly, on the 2d day of November
A. D. 1866.

John S. McBride
Sheriff R. Co. Ill.
By John R. Shannon
Deputy S. J.

Shiff Fees Service 75
Mileage 40 mls 2.50
Return 10
\$2.85



Received of the Sheriff of the County of Cook, Ill. the sum of \$2.85 for the above services rendered by John R. Shannon, Deputy Sheriff, on the 2d day of November, 1866.

The People of the State of Illinois
County of Cook

Illinois Supreme Court, --- First Grand Division.

LESSLY et. al.
vs.
LESSLY.

} Error to Randolph.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF.

The complainant below, as widow of her deceased husband, who left no descendent, was unquestionably entitled to the usual articles of personal property, or their value. 2 Purp. Stat. 1201, Sec. 50. Detzler vs. Schuester, 37 Ill. R. 304. Also to one-half of the real estate in fee simple. Sharges vs. Ewing, 18 Ill. R. 180, &c.

2. Was she entitled to dower in the other half, and the surplus of the personal property, after paying the debts of the estate?

a. Where the husband dies *intestate*, leaving a widow and no descendent, it is very certain that she is so entitled. Tyson vs. Postlethwaite, 13 Ill. R. 728. Tyler vs. Tyler, 19 Id. 155, per Breese, Justice. Cruse, Admr., vs. Cruse, 21 Id. 49. Cross vs. Carey, 25 Id. 564.

b. By the statute of 1829, in the Revised Laws of 1833, page 624, under the proper title of "*Wills*," provision is made for widows renouncing under wills, and thereby taking as in cases of *intestate* estates, and abating legacies, if necessary, to that end. Mr. Gilman, in his revision of the statutes of 1845, under the title, "*Dower*," incorporated some of the sections and parts of sections of the prior law, and added the 15th section, which so puzzled this court in the case in 13 Ill. R.

That section was manifestly introduced to benefit, and not to injure, the widow. 13 Ill. R. 732. It does not provide that she shall have no more than is there indicated. Id. 733-6-7-8. Under our state constitution, which declares that members of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the government, shall receive certain sums, and "no more," it is settled by common consent that they may incidentally have additional compensation.

If there is an apparent conflict between the chapter entitled "*Dower*" and the chapter entitled "*Wills*," the latter must govern. 2 Purp. Stat., 1024, Sec. 23. 13 Ill. R., 739.

c. Even the chapter entitled "*Dower*" provides that by renouncing under the will she becomes entitled to her dower in the lands, or *share* in the personal estate, of her husband. 1 Purp. Stat., 497, Sec. 11. Sec. 15 also gives her an undivided half of the real estate in fee simple.

d. The estate being *as to her* *intestate*, she is entitled to dower in the other half of the lands, and the surplus of the personal estate after paying debts under Sec. 46 of the statute of *Wills*.

WM. H. UNDERWOOD, Sol. for Def. in Error.

Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

FIRST GRAND DIVISION.

November Term, 1866.

SAMUEL W. LESSLY, *et. al.*, Plaintiff in Error, }
vs. } ERROR TO RANDOLPH.
MARY LESSLY, Plaintiff in Error.

ABSTRACT.

PAGE 1 Bill in chancery for Relief filed for April Term., A. D., 1865, Mary Lessly complainant in the bill alleged, that she is the wife of Mathew Lessly, deceased, who died in April, 1864, leaving no children, descendants of children, father or mother surviving,
2 but left a brother and sister, children and other heirs; that he left both personal and
3 real estate, described in page two and three; that said Mathew Lessly left a last Will
10-11 and Testament, which has been proved, by which he makes sundry special bequests and legacies, among others the lands to his wife for life, with remainder *in fee* to Mathew
3 Lessly; that she, the complainant, on the 12th of September, 1864, renounced the provision made for her in said Will, and elected to take her dower or legal share of the estate of her husbands, also on the 13th of September 1864, again under her hand and
4 seal she elected in *lieu* of dower and the provisions in said Will for her benefit, one half the real estate and *dower* in the other half, and the whole of his personal property, after paying all the just debts and claims against the estate of her said deceased husband; that the personal estate is more than sufficient to pay the debts of the deceased and administration expenses; and prays that she be invested with the title to half of the real estate and dower in the other half, and that the same be set apart to her, etc.
6 Dovisee's made party to the Will.
7 Answer to Bill. Admits that the said Mary is the widow of said Mathew Lessly, and that said Mathew left no child or descendants of children at his death; admits the will as set out in complainants bill to be correct; admits that said Mary relinquished provisions in the will, as set out in her bill of complainant, and that collateral heirs are correctly described therein, but denies that she is entitled to one half of the real estate, denies that if even she is entitled to one half of the land, she is entitled to
8 dower in the other half, and respondent denies further that complainant is entitled to the personal estate of the deceased, since the whole personal property is bequeathed in said will, and is a charge upon the estate for the payment thereof; and if entitled to one half of the real estate, she is entitled to nothing more, except, unless it be her widow's pharaphanalia, and further charges that said Mary by her election, has no right to any part of the personal estate.
9 Exceptions to answer, wherein it denies complainants, legal and equitable rights, etc.
11 Answer of guardian *at litem*.
13 Final hearing of the cause.
14 Decree of Court, that the S. half, N. E. quarter of section 20, and the S. W. Qr.,
15 of N. W. quarter, township 4 N. R. 6 West, 3d principal meridian, and 50 acres adjoining, be divided, one half to be set apart to her and the other half according to the provisions of the Will, and that she also be entitled to dower therein, and appoints commissioner to set off and make partition, to the rendition of which decree the said defendants at the time and after.

ERRORS.

- 1st. The Court erred in decreeing dower to Mary Lessly in the half of said land not set apart to her.
- 2d. The Court erred in decreeing, that the separate property allowed to widows under the statute be set apart to Mary Lessly.
- 3d. The Court erred in rendering said decree in manner and form as rendered, as it indefinite in settling whether the specific legacies were or were not to be paid

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

This record involves no disagreement as to facts, but simply the construction of section 15, chapter 34, Purple's Stat., p. 497-8, to wit:

If a husband shall die, leaving a widow, but no children, nor descendants of children, such widow may, if she elect, have *in lieu* of her *dower* in the estate of which her husband *died seized*, whether the same shall have been assigned or not, absolutely, and in her own right as if she were

sole one half of all her real estate, which shall remain after payment of debts *against the deceased husband*.

Provided, if dower in such estate shall have been assigned, she shall make such new election within two months, after being notified of the payment of such debts.

In this class of cases, whether deceased did testate or intestate, if this section was the only law, the words "in lieu of dower" exclude certainly dower in the other half of the land.

In *Tyron vs. Postlewaite*, 13 Ill., p. 727, it would seem to have been ruled otherwise. By that decision the foregoing section was left subject to the imputation that it was a dead letter.

Sturgis, et. al., vs. Ewing, 18. Ill. 180.

2. This section 15, approved in 1845, does not go so far as the clause on the same subject-matter in the 46 section chapter Wills—that gives dower in all cases allowed by law, *this half* the land only, *in lieu of dower*, and if they are in conflict the last must prevail.

Purples Stat. 1024, § 22, 23 and 24.

But if the 15th section had been silent, and no other section of law in force on the subject from the very nature of such *election* in analogy with charges on realty, as a whole, her election of the half would discharge pro tanto at least.

White vs. White, 1 Harrison 202-211.

Litt. 222, Gibb. on Rents 152.

Adam vs. Hoffman, 9 Watts 530, 541.

Cord on Rights of married women, 321.

II.

1. Nothing but the question of the right of the widow to one half the land was before the Court for decision in the case of *Sturgis et. al. vs. Ewing*, 18 Ill., p. 176. Her right to that is decided nothing more. Dower in the other half of the land, or personal property, was not before the Court in that case.

2. Taking the 15th section (above) its subject matter, its association with section 10 and 11 in the same chapter, its reference to the *new* election, which shows the Legislature must had the 10th and 11th section in view, and a case of testate estate, it seems to us, its object was solely to legislate and provide a different right to that class of Widows whose husbands died *testate*, without children or descendants of such.

3. The two laws, section 46, chapter 109, and section 15, chapter 34, may thus stand, the one for intestate and the other for testate estate, but it is impossible to say those sections of law place the widows on the same footing. The one, section 46, gives half the land, *all* the personalty after payment of debts, *against such estate* are paid, and dower as provided by law. The other, section 15, gives one half the land after payment of debts against the deceased *husband in lieu of dower*, and no personal property, and dower as provided by law, or at least is silent on those points.

Blackwell Tax Titles, page 712-13 *et seq.*

On construction of statutes.

4. Such widow of testator, has the right to take the provision in the will, or if she *elect* she can take her rights of dower as provided by law, and when she so choses and relinquishes her rights under the Will, the law remits her back to all her rights of *dower*, but if her husband leaves mother, child, descendants of such, she may make a *new* election, one half the land after payment of *the husbands debts, in lieu of dower*, that is, she, by the new election surrenders all her rights of dower, which without that she would have had under her first election under section 10 and 11.

5. Is such widow entitled to dower in the other half of the land under this section? What language is there in section 15 to assume it? No personal property is given to her by section 15. (Dower is defined by the statute, as to intestates, to be one third part of personal estate after payment of debts. Purple's Stat., section 161, page 1224.) This, in her *new election*, she abandons. She agreed to take one half the land in fee in lieu of it. We think she cannot hold dower and personalty, when she elects to take half the land, in lieu of her dower, as that dower is defined under the 11th section; if she had made no new choice, she could have it, but having done so, she abandons it.

6. On this record, the widow by her election has no right, we think, to absorb the personal estate, and defeat the legatees, of the legacies bequeathed. Yet it will be insisted that those are not debts of the *husband*. That by this section of the law she is bound, cannot be denied, no other gives the right of such election. Before she can reach her rights under section 15, she abandons the provisions of the Will—and next, her rights of dower, as defined in section 11, chapter 34, and no part of the personal estate is given her by it. The section is a statutory *innovation* and subject to strict construction.

In Blackwell on Tax titles, page 712.

O'MELVENY & HOUCK.

Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.

No 29
Lesly
vs.
Lesly

Errors to Randolph

Continued with
alias

Filed Nov 9, 1868
Noah Johnston Clk

O'NEILL & HODICK

Attorneys at Law in Boston

In *Whipple v. Fox*, 137 Mass. 115.

has to state construction. The section is a general construction and may be held of the personal estate of a testator in section 11, chapter 92, and the provisions of the *Will*—and that the right of descent is given to the issue of the testator. This is the section of the law which is given to the issue of the testator. It is well to be noted that the law is given to the issue of the testator. It is well to be noted that the law is given to the issue of the testator.

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Illinois Supreme Court, -- First Grand Division.

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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF.

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b. By the statute of 1829, in the Revised Laws of 1833, page 624, under the proper title of "Wills," provision is made for widows renouncing under wills, and thereby taking as in cases of intestate estates, and abating legacies, if necessary, to that end. Mr. Gilman, in his revision of the statutes of 1845, under the title, "Dower," incorporated some of the sections and parts of sections of the prior law, and added the 15th section, which so puzzled this court in the case in 13 Ill. R.

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c. Even the chapter entitled "Dower" provides that by renouncing under the will she becomes entitled to "her dower in the lands, or share in the personal estate, of her husband. 1 Purp. Stat., 497, Sec. 11. Sec. 15 also gives her an undivided half of the real estate in fee simple.

d. The estate being *as to her* intestate, she is entitled to dower in the other half of the lands, and the surplus of the personal estate after paying debts under Sec. 46 of the statute of Wills.

WM. H. UNDERWOOD, Sol. for Deft. in Error.

Reply et al.
vs
Reply
Defendants to Brief

Filed June 5th 1864
Wm. Johnston Clk

Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

FIRST GRAND DIVISION.

November Term, 1866.

SAMUEL W. LESSLY, *et. al.*, Plaintiff in Error, }
vs. } ERROR TO RANDOLPH.
MARY LESSLY, Plaintiff in Error.

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- 1st. The Court erred in decreeing dower to Mary Lessly in the half of said land not set apart to her.
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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

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In Blackwell on Tax titles, page 712.

O'MELVENY & HOUCK.

Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.

